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Nevertheless, it would now appear that a judge on the High
Court has three guides or choices when next confronted with a donatio
mortis causa situation. He can follow Cain v. Moon 2 expressly
adopted in Eppen v. Szczepkowski 13 by Mr. Justice Roach; or he can
follow the hybrid requirement found in Thomas v. Mechan;14 or, if
desired, he can require the donor to be in extremis relying upon
5
Mr. Justice Roach's latest decision, Canada Trust Co. v. Labadie.1
CAM HARVEY"

ROSS-SMITH VS. ROsS-SMIT-CONFLICT OF LAWS-ANNULMENTJURISDICON-VOm AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES-Recently the majority
of the House of Lords in Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith' held that the
fact that a marriage is celebrated in England does not confer jurisdiction on an English court in nullity actions, if the marriage is
voidable and the respondent is neither domiciled nor resident in
England.
In the Ross-Smith case the petitioner-wife was resident in England, the husband being domiciled in Scotland and resident in the
Middle East The wife prayed for annulment on the ground of nonconsummation owing to either the impotence or wilful refusal of the
appellant husband. At trial 2 Karminski, J., stated that there was a
distinction between void and voidable marriages as regards jurisdiction and following Casey v. Casey3 he held that the place of celebration was not sufficient to found jurisdiction in an action for annulment of a voidable marriage. The Court of Appeal 4 reversed this
decision on the ground that Simonin v. Maflac5 (a void marriage
situation) held that the court had jurisdiction on the sole ground
that the marriage was celebrated in England; and there being no
distinction between a void and voidable marriage for jurisdictional
purposes, the rule in Simonin v. Mallac applied:
The question of jurisdiction of the English court was fully argued and
it was held by the full court that jurisdiction existed on the ground that
the marriage had been celebrated in England . . . the decision has
stood for 100 years and, though freqently cited, has never been questioned.
It (Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax)6 decided once and for all that
no distinction is to be drawn, for jurisdictional purposes, between marriages void ab initio and those which are merely voidable.... The
decision in Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax is to be preferred and
is to be followed.7
12

Supra, footnote (2).

13 [1945] O.R. 540.

14 Supra, footnote (5).

35 upra, footnote (1).
*Mr. Harvey is in second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1962] 1 All E.R. 344.
2 [1960] 3 All E.R. 70.
3 [1949] 2 All E.R. 110.
4 [1961] 1 All E.R. 255.
5 (1860), 2 Sw & Tr. 67.
6 [1955] 2 All E.R 709.
7 Per Wilmer L. J., supra, footnote 4 at p. 260.
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The two issues that were before the House of Lords were firstly, the
validity of Simonin v. Ma7kw and secondly, whether or not there
was a distinction between void and voidable marriages for the purposes of jurisdiction.
The majority of the House of Lords (Lord Merriman and Lord
Hodson dissenting) found that Simonin v. Maac9 was wrongly decided. In Simonin v. Mallac the parties were both domiciled and
resident in France and being unable to get parental consent required
by French law they came to England and were married in London.
The parties thereafter returned to Paris but never co-habited and
the plan to regularize the marriage by French law miscarried. The
wife subsequently acquired a decree of nullity in the French Courts.
After taking up residence in England, the wife then brought an
action for annulment in the English Court. The English court assumed jurisdiction on the basis that "the parties by professing to
enter into a contract in England mutually gave to each other the
right to have the force and effect of that contract determined by
an English tribunal". 10 The majority of the House of Lords held
this reasoning to be erroneous" and further stated that Simonin's
Case could not be supported on the basis of jurisdiction being previously possessed by the ecclesiastical courts.12
Simonin v. Ma~dc having been found to have been wrongly
decided, the question arose as to whether or not it should be expressly
overruled. Their Lordships resolved the case by drawing a distinction
between void and voidable marriages and held that the anomalous
"rule" in Simonin's Case would not extend to voidable marriages.
Their Lordships did not arrive at any conclusive and final answer
with respect to the future applicability of the "rule" in cases involving
a void marriage.'3 An examination of the attitudes expressed by
the various judges towards overruling Simonin's Case reveals that
three judges' 4 were inclined to overrule it but it was not necessary
to do so; two judges' 5 said they would not overrule it; Lord Morris' 6
was reluctant to overrule it; and Lord Hodson' 7 said that the decision
could be overruled, but only with hesitation. In order to determine
whether or not the House of Lords would overrule Simonin's Case,
if called upon to do so, it is necessary to examine the reasoning of
the House of Lords more carefully.
8 Supra, footnote 5.
9 Ibid.

lo Ibid, at p. 74.

11 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 349.
12 Ibid., at p. 350.
13 Since no final answer was given by the House of Lords, the "rule" in
Simonin's case is still being applied in cases involving void marriages:
Merker v. Merker [19621 3 All E.R., 928, infra, footnote 33.
14 Lord Reid, Lord Morton, supra, footnote 1 at p. 355 and Lord Cohen,
ibid. at p. 383.
B Lord Cohen, ibid., 358 and Lord Merriman, ibid., 380.
at p. 366.
17 Ibid., at p. 371.
16 Ibid.,
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Both Lord Cohen and Lord Merriman were against overruling
the "rule" in Simonin's case on the basis that "the decision has
stood for over a hundred years and it has been followed or applied
in a very large number of cases."' 8 This argument was countered by
Lord Cohen who said, "if the Court has not jurisdiction, it cannot
confer jurisdiction on itself by wrongly assuming it". 19 Lord Cohen
in expressin his view that the "rule" in Simonin's Case should not
be overruled stated that:
... a number of statutes have been passed affecting the jurisdiction of the
High Court in Matrimonial matters and the legislature may be presumed
to have proceeded on the basis that the jurisdiction
in nullity matters
was that assumed by the court in Simonin v. Malic.20

The argument that Simonin v. Mallac ought not to be overruled because someone has regulated his affairs in reliance of its validity
was turned down by both Lord Reid 21 and Lord Cohen.22 Lord
Morris said that the:
Particular place where the ceremony of marriage takes place may have
no relevance as between the parties so far as their marriage status is
concerned
assuming that the ceremony did bring about such marriage
status.23

Lord Hodson, however, points out that "the courts of the country of
celebration will often be the most convenient and given a particular
set of facts, hardship cases will arise whatever the basis of jurisdiction may be." 24
With respect, it is submitted that if convenience were held to be
a ground for jurisdiction, it would lead to a great deal more confusion in the field of private international law since it would almost
invariably be open to dispute as to whether or not it was convenient
for a particular court to have assumed jurisdiction in the particular
case.
After pointing out that the "rule" in Simonin's case is, from the
strictly legal point of view, in conflict with the principle finally settled
in the Le Mesurier2 5 and SaZvesen 26 cases Lord Reid gives very convincing practical reasons against the existence of the rule. His
Lordship points out that such grounds for jurisdiction are unnecessary
where.the parties are domiciled within the jurisdiction or where the
respondent is resident within the jurisdiction. He states that:
* * it enables a foreigner who happens to have been married In England
to come here and raise proceedings against a spouse who may never have
had any other connection with England than the fact that the parties
Is Ibid., 357.
1
9 Ibid., 382.
20 Ibid., 357.
21 Ibid., 354.
22 Ibid., 357.
2
2 3 Ibid., 367.
4 Ibid., 371.
25
26

[1895] A.C. 517.
[1927] A.C. 671.
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came here to be married: the respondent is then faced with the choice
of incurring great expense and trouble in coming here to defend the
case or allowing it to go by default.2 7

Where jurisdiction is confined to the domicile or residence of the
parties it is unlikely that any such expense would fall upon a respondent who is obliged to defend a suit for nullity of a void marriage
when he is already domiciled or resident within the jurisdiction.
Although it would seem possible that when a court assumes jurisdiction on the basis of domicile, inconvenience may be forced upon
a respondent who does not reside in that jurisdiction though he may
be domiciled there. However, there would seem to be no merit in
multiplying cases of inconvenience by assuming jurisdiction on
grounds of celebration within the jurisdiction.
Lord Reid further points out that, in the case of foreigners
having the same domicile, the assumption of jurisdiction by the
English courts on the basis of celebration in England would enable
the English court to grant a petition for nullity, "but a decree of the
English court would not then prevent the court of the domicile from
reaching a contrary decision". 28
It may be argued that the same difficulty would arise where the
English court assumed jurisdiction on the grounds of residence of
the parties who were domiciled elsewhere2 9 but it is less probable,
where the parties are resident in England, that they would be domiciled elsewhere. Whereas, there is a greater probability that parties
who have merely celebrated a marriage in England could be domiciled
elsewhere there being a close correlation between domicile and residence than between domicile and place of celebration. In any event if
these probabilities are not valid, there is still no reason for compounding an already existing difficulty.
Whether or not the House of Lords will overrule Simonin's case
is uncertain. However, the pronouncements given by the House
of Lords suggest a tendency against the existence of the rule in
27 Bupra, footnote 1, at p. 355.
28 Ibid., at p. 355. This difficulty is illustrated by Simonin v. Maflac where
the French court, the court of the parties domicile, granted a decree of
nullity, whereas the English court, which assumed jurisdiction on the basis
of celebration within the jurisdiction, held the marriage to be valid.
29
This difficulty might be eliminated if the court of the domicile of the
parties recognized the decree of the English court on the grounds that the
English court properly assumed jurisdiction. The difficulty might also be
eliminated if the English court applied the law of the domicile of the parties
to determine post-nuptial grounds for annulment with the result that the
court of the parties' domicile would almost always arrive at the same con.
clusion though there may be cases where the court of the parties' domicile
would arrive at a different result as in Simonin 'v. MaZlac. In that case,
the English and French courts characterized a pre-nuptial impediment differently. The English court applied the law of the place of celebration
(England) to the impediment because they characterized it as going to the
formal validity of the marriage. The French court applied French law to
the impediment because the parties were French. By English law, the marriage was valid; by French law the marriage was invalid.
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Simonin v. Mallac. There is nevertheless, a possibility that the House
of Lords may subsequently refuse to overrule it in relation to void
marriages by applying the reasoning of Lord Cohen where he states:
... the decision has stood for over a hundred years and it has been
followed or applied in a very large number of cases not only in this
country but in many other parts of the Commonwealth.3 0

The reasoning of Lord Cohen may also be applicable to voidable
marriages since the rule in Simonin's case has also been relied on in
cases of voidable marriages; Hill v. Hill,31 Addison v. Addison. 32
Now, this avenue of approach has been closed by the House of Lords
by their having drawn a distinction between void and voidable marriages for purposes of jurisdiction and overruling the latter two
cases. In drawing this distinction and merely holding that the rule
in ,imonin's case does not apply to voidable marriages, the decision
in Simonin v. MaYllc still stands with respect to void marriages. 33
This raises the next issue discussed by the House of Lords, namely,
the distinction between void and voidable marriages.
As to the second problem dealt with by the House of Lords,
Lord Reid discusses the distinction between void and voidable
marriages saying, "I think it very important to see what practical
differences there are in this connection." 3 4 He deals first with the
fact that the wife in a void marriage is capable of acquiring a
domicile separate from that of her husband, whereas with a voidable
marriage she cannot. He goes on to say that in a void marriage
there may be no court whose decision is paramount (as there would
be in a voidable marriage) and "there is, therefore, something to
be said for recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the locus celebrationis.35 Secondly, he reiterates the well accepted principle that
in regard to a void marriage, anyone may raise the invalidity at any
time, whereas with a voidable marriage only a spouse may question it, and only during the lifetime of the other spouse. The
third difference pointed out is where the lex loci celebrationishas to
be applied to determine the issue. His Lordship states that it is
against public policy for a party in a voidable marriage to be able
to come to England and get relief for wilful refusal to consummate
when his or her own domicile would hold the marriage valid, not
recognizing such a ground for annulment.
It is submitted that Lord Reid has dealt, as he himself has
said, with the practical differences existing and not, except perhaps
vaguely in his first distinction, with the importance of the distinction
for jurisdictional purposes.
30 Supra, footnote I at p. 357.
31 [1959) 3 All E.R. 354.
32 [1955] N. Ir. 1.
33The rule in Simonin's case was recently followed in an action for
annulment of, a void marriage, Merker v. Merker, supra, footnote 13. Whether
or not the "rule" will continue to be followed in Canadian cases is discussed
infra, pp. 529, 560.
34 [1962] 1 All E.R. 345, at p. 356.
35 Ibid.
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Lord Cohen, in his judgment referred to Casey v. CaseyS6 which
held that the fact a marriage was celebrated in England does not
confer jurisdiction on the High Court in a voidable marriage. He
agrees with the decision and cites a passage, with approval, that
analogizes divorce and annulment of a voidable marriage. Perhaps
Lord Cohen erroneously agreed with the purported analogy, in view of
the fact that the Court of Appeal3 7 had overruled Inverclyde v.
Invercyde3 s on which Casey v. Casey was based. It should be pointed
out that Bateson J. in Invercyde was the first judge to draw a distinction between void and voidable marriages as regards jurisdiction.
His Lordship asserted that there was a distinction between void and
voidable marriages and he refused to extend Simonin v. Maac39 to
voidable marriages.40
This may be the very question to be answered, namely, whether
or not there should be any difference between void and voidable
marriages for jurisdictional purposes, The ecclesiastical courts drew
no such distinction as regards jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the
High Court is derived from that exercised by the ecclesiastical courts.
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, s. 22, was re-enacted by the
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s. 32. Sections
22 and 32 state the jurisdiction of the High Court to be "as nearly
as may be conformable to the principles and rules of the court which
previously exercised the jurisdiction."
It should also be noted that Lord MacDermott in Addison v.
Addison4 ' refused to follow Casey on grounds that there was no
justification for "splitting the nullity jurisdiction as between void
and voidable marriages."
Lord Hodson, in his dissenting judgment, dealt with the views of
Lord Cohen and Lord Reid. His Lordship did not agree with the
decision in Casey v. Casey42 because it was "based on the misconception that in the case of voidable marriages there is some affinity
between nullity and divorce." 43 As to the distinctions set out by Lord
Reid, he asserted that they did not touch the question of jurisdiction.
He stated:
36 [1949] P. 420.
3
7Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [1955] 3 All E.R., 695. see Denning
I. (as he then was) at p. 697.
38 [1931] P. 29.

39 (1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67.
40 [1962] 1 All E.R. 344, at p. 360.
41 [1955] N. Ir. 1 at p. 30. The Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce Cmd 9678 section 872 states that the Scottish Court has had no
occasion in the past to draw a distinction between void and voidable marriages
in deciding whether it has jurisdiction in nullity actions.
42

[1949] P. 420.

[1962] 2 All E.R. 344 at p. 372. Compare with Dicey, Conflict of Laws,
7th ed., at p. 361 and the English Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce, Cmd. 9678, section 892, where the contrary views are expressed.
43
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I remain convinced that the line of cleavage for jurisdictional purposes
is between divorce and nullity and not between different kinds of nullity
proceedings. 44

He added that such a distinction for the purposes of jurisdiction is
no more satisfactory than a distinction between one kind of void
marriage and another.45 Lord Hodson asserts that the courts have

disregarded any distinction where jurisdiction has been founded on
common domicile 46 and on residence. As to the latter, his Lordship
pointed out that the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in nullity
actions was based on residence only and this was so regardless of
the ground that the suit may have been instituted on. The courts now
are justified in substituting residence in England for the equivalent
residence in the ecclesiastical diocese, Lord Hodson states:
The appellant accepts this adaptation or extension of the former ecclesias.
tical jurisdiction from residence in the diocese not only to residence in
England but also to domicile and draws no distinction between marriages
void and voidable.... The appellant, however, while accepting residence
and domicile as the proper foundations for jurisdiction says that the
supposed rule that the place of celebration gives jurisdiction ought not
to be accepted.4 7

Dicey states that there is no logic in maintaining a distinction

between void and voidable marriages when jurisdiction is exercised
on the ground that the marriage is celebrated in England and the
rejection of the distinction when jurisdiction is exercised on the
ground of residence.

48

If the House of Lords does subsequently overrule Simonin's case,
then all grounds upon which the court assumes jurisdiction in a void
marriage will be proper grounds for assuming jurisdiction in a voidable marriage.49 The result would be that for all practical purposes
there would be no distinction between void and voidable marriages
with respect to jurisdiction. If the House of Lords subsequently
refuses to overrule the "rule" in Simonin's case then the only situation
where there would be any distinction between a void and voidable
marriage for purposes of jurisdiction would be its foundation on
the grounds of celebration within the jurisdiction. This distinction
44
Tbid. The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Cmd. 9678, section 881 reads as follows: ". . . we think that for the purpose of defining the
jurisdiction of the court, a distinction must be drawn between void and
voidable marriages."

45 The

Court of Appeal in Ross-Smith,

[19611 1 All E.R. 255 criticized the

decision of Collingwood J. in HiZZ v. Hi•Z, [19601 P. 130 insofar as It suggested

that a petition on the ground of wilful refusal to consummate might be

distinguishable
from one alleging impotence.
46
Savesen v. Austrian Property Administrator, [19271 A.C. '641.
47 [19621 1 All E.R., 344 at p. 369. Dicey also asserts that in the ecclesias.
tical courts, the distinction was irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes: see
Dice , Conflict of Laws, 7th ed., at p. 360.
4 Dicey, supra, footnote 47. See also similar views in Castel: Private
InternationaZLaw p. 114. and Falconbridge: Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. p. 689,
footnote 5. For a concise view of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce on the whole question of jurisdiction in
nullity actions, regard should be had to the Draft Code in Appendix IV of the
Royal
Commission Report.
49
See Castel, supra, footnote 48.
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would rest upon an anomolous decision which was wrongly decided;
not on any inherent difference between void and voidable marriages
with respect to jurisdiction. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted
that the House of Lords ought not to have determined the dispute
before them by drawing a distinction between void and voidable
marriages in relation to jurisdiction. A more logical approach would
have been to either refuse to overrule the rule in Simonin's case and
extend the anomoly to voidable marriages, or, more preferably, to
have overruled the rule in Simonin's case in relation to both void and
voidable marriages and held that a place of celebration is not ground
for jurisdiction in either case.
It is now necessary to deal with the significance of the RossSmith decision in relation to Canadian decisions.
In Spencer v. Ladd5o a decision of the Supreme Court of Alberta,
Boyd McBride J., held that he had jurisdiction to try an action for
annulment of a void marriage where jurisdiction is founded on the
marriage having been celebrated in Alberta. The court here followed
the rule in Simonin's case. In Gower v. Starrett,51 a decision of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, Farris C.J.S.C. held that the
elements giving jurisdiction in a nullity action are the same whether
the marriage is void ab initio or voidable only. In Reid v. Francis,52
a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Martin J.A. held
that a marriage having been celebrated in Saskatchewan conferred
jurisdiction on the Saskatchewan court to entertain a suit for a
declaration of nullity of a voidable marriage. The Court of Appeal
applied the "rule" in Simonin's case to voidable marriages. Fleming
v. Fleming53 a decision of a single judge in the High Court of
Justice of Ontario, followed the decision of Inverelyde v. InverclydeP4
and decided that the court of the parties domicile had exclusive jurisdiction in a suit for annulment of a voidable marriage. The House of
Lords overruled Inverclyde v. Inverclyde55 in so far as it refused to
recognize residence as a ground of jurisdiction 56 and their Lordships
approved of the dicta in DeReneville v. DeReneville 57 and the decision
in Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax54 to the effect that residence
was a proper ground upon which a court may assume jurisdiction
in an action for annulment
In view of the differences between the earlier Canadian decisions
and the recent decision of the House of Lords in Ross-Smith v. RossSmith, the questions now arise as to what approach will be taken in
subsequent Canadian decisions on the issue of jurisdiction in nullity
50 [1948)
51 [1948]
52 [19293
53 [1934)
54 [1931)
55 Ibid:,
56 [19621
57 [1947]

1 D.L.R. 39.
2 D.L.R. 853.
4 D.L.R. 311.
O.R. 588.
P. 29.

1 Al E.R 344, at p. 354.
2 All E.R. 112.
53 [19553 3 All E.R. 695.
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actions. Will the Canadian Courts express the view that since
Simonin v. Nalcc was wrongly decided, when there is no foundation
for jurisdiction in either a void or voidable marriage based on
celebration within the jurisdiction thus overruling Spencer v. Ladd59
and Reid v. Francis?60 Will the Canadian courts overrule the decision
in Gower v. Starrett61 and draw a distinction between void and
voidable marriages and hold, as did the House of Lords, that
there is no jurisdiction on the basis of celebration within the jurisdiction in the case of a voidable marriage? Or will subsequent
Canadian decisions adopt the reasoning in Gower v. Starrett62 and
find no distinction between void and voidable marriages and further
hold that though the "rule" in Simonin's case, though wrongly decided, is to be applied in both void and voidable marriages? The
final question raised is whether or not the Ontario courts will reverse
their earlier position 63 and subsequently assume jurisdiction on the
basis of residence or even celebration within the province or whether
they will continue to limit their jurisdiction in voidable marriages
to the sole ground of domicile within the province? It is submitted
that in view of the fact that the analogy between divorce and voidable
marriages expressed in Inverclyde v. Inverclyde64 and followed in
Fleming v. Fleming65 was disapproved of in Ramsay-Fairfax v.
Ramsay-Fairfax66 the Ontario courts will be less reluctant to extend
their jurisdiction in nullity actions especially since the House of
Lords has held Inverclyde v. Inverclyde67 to be wrong insofar as it
refused to recognize residence as a grounds for jurisdiction. 68 The
approach to be eventually taken by the Canadian courts and the
effect of the Ross-Smith decision on this approach must be patiently
awaited until the issues are raised before them.
RON RuBiNoFFO
HARTLEY NATHAN"
FELDSTEIN VS. ALLOY MTETAL SALES LTD.-NEGLIGENCE--VICARIOUS
LIABiLrrY-GRATuITous PASSENGERS-SECTION 105, ONTARIO HIGHWAY TRAFFIc Act-An article, Section 105: Ontario Highway Traffic

Act in Volume 2, Part 3 of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal'
briefly reviewed the operation of the "gratuitous passenger" section
of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act 2 placing special emphasis on the
59

Supra,footnote 50.
60 Supra, footnote 52.
61
Supra, footnote 51.
62
Supra, footnote 51.
63 Fleming v. Fleming [1934] 0.1
64
65
66

588.

Supra, footnote 54.

Supra, footnote 63.
Supra, footnote 57.

67
6 Supra, footnote 54.
s Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1962J 1 All E.R. 344, p. 354.
*Messrs. Rubinoff and Nathan are in the third year at Osgoode Hall
Law School.
12 O.H.L.J. (1961-62) p. 322.
2 lS.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105.

